The reflections here will not assess the veracity
or otherwise of Clinton’s claims on the role of “white men” in that election
but would focus more pointedly to what impact this demographic constituency,
which Clinton undoubtedly feels is crucially important to her political
ambitions and destiny, had on her performance and policy outcomes on Africa
specifically, whilst she was US secretary of state in January 2009-February
2013.
Contradictory
THE background to Clinton becoming US secretary of state in 2009 would, in the
overall, appear to lend some element of credibility to the premise of her
presumed problematic relationship with the country’s “white men” electorate,
albeit contradictorily. In the previous year, 2008, Clinton had had a bitterly
fought presidential election contest with Barack Obama, an African
American, in which she was beaten. On winning, Obama actively sought Clinton’s
goodwill by offering her the position of secretary of state in his incoming
administration and paying off her huge outstanding campaign debts with surplus
funds from the former’s campaign organisation. Clinton’s acceptance of Obama’s
cabinet position offer helped in the process of “healing” in the Democratic
party after the evidently rancorous poll and her tacit agreement not to
challenge the latter in the 2012 election cycle, if he were to seek another
term’s presidential run, also included an “understanding” that a 2-term
President Obama would deploy the incalculable resources of such an incumbency
to support his former rival to run again for the presidency in 2016.
So, thanks to Barack Obama, the African American,
i.e., “[not]white man”, indeed
the first African-descent elected president after 233
years of the founding of the US republic, Hilary Clinton becomes secretary of
state in January 2009 and is duly emplaced on the path of contesting for the
presidency, yet again, this time with the expected robust backing of her new
“ally” and employer.
Imposition and invasion
On Africa, right from the outset, two distinct policy areas defined the Obama
administration’s focus: imposition and invasion – not too distinct from
generally the case in previous US administrations. And both (new) president and
secretary of state were in tandem in
the formulation and implementation of this mission. A year in office, Obama
reinstated the notorious trail of France’s invasion history in Africa which his
predecessor, George W Bush (“white man”, “right-wing”!), had blocked
for seven years as “punishment” for the 2003 French refusal to join the
US-led coalition invasion of Iraq. Prior to Bush’s ban, the French had carried
out 48 military invasions of most of the so-called 22 so-called francophonie
states in Africa between 1960 and 2003 which every US president of the era
each supported.
Elated by the Obama approval, French President
Sarkozy at once resumed his country’s 50 years of flagrant military
campaigns in Africa. Sarkozy ordered his military to invade Côte d’Ivoire (French
invasion no. 49 of an African state since 1960) which overthrew the government
of President Laurent Gbagbo in the process and installed a new regime
headed by an Ivorian puppet who would oversee the vast French economic and
strategic interests in the country and region. During the assault, 2300
Africans were murdered and several business and residential districts of the
commercial city of Abidjan, the principal focus of the invasion, were
significantly destroyed.
Emboldened by the French “success” in Côte
d’Ivoire in southwestcentral Africa, Obama mapped out further to the north
of the continent, to Libya, a year later, 2011, to implement his next
invasion target in Africa which would be executed by the US and the
French, and Britain, the other lead EuropeanConqueror-state of Africa. This
time round, the US would be a far more active, direct participant in
the operation. Indeed, Hillary Clinton took up the composite range of most
uncompromising advocacy for the US involvement in the Libya invasion that its
politics and aftermath became the central plank of her record as secretary of
state.
Just as in Côte d’Ivoire, the invasion of Libya was
catastrophic. The West tripartite force overthrew the Muammar
Gaddafi regime during the attack, Gaddafi himself was murdered as well as
some members of his family in addition to some influential officials of his
regime, hundreds of other Libyans were murdered, and most Libyan cities and
principal communication network (outstanding achievements of the Gaddafi years
in office) were spectacularly smashed up. Obama could not restrain himself in
emphasising the crucial role of the US in this operation: “we [the US] had
wiped out all [Libyan] air defenses and essentially set up the entire infrastructure
[for the invasion]” (Jeffery Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, The Atlantic, April 2016 Issue,
April 2016).
IT SHOULD now be obvious that:
1a. “white man”-president can invade, overthrow, impose; “[not]white
man”-president can invade, overthrow, impose
1b. “white man”-state
functionaries can pursue policies to invade, overthrow, impose; “[not]white
man”-state functionaries can pursue policies to invade, overthrow, impose
2. “white man”-president/“white man”-king/ “white
man”-chancellor/“white man”-prime minister/“white man”-general/“white
man”-journalist/“white man”-academic/“white man”-cleric/“white
man”-farmer… has planned, executed, supported genocide(s) against a
people or peoples over the course of recent history
3. “[not]white man”-president/“[not] white man”-king/“[not]white
man” attorney/“[not]white man”-journalist/“[not]white man-academic/“[not]
white man”-cleric/“[not] white man”-sergeant/“[not]white
man”-corporal/“[not]white man”-general… has planned, executed, supported
genocide(s) against a people or peoples over the course of recent history
Surely, a serious, fruitful examination of any feature of human society
requires the development, articulation and deployment of critical tools of analysis to
help or enhance interpretation and understanding. As we have shown, Hillary
Clinton’s “white man” lexicon and its variations have surely not been helpful
tools to enable us understand what, in fact, presents as the unchanging thrust
and tenor in the trajectory of US foreign policy in Africa for the greater part
of the past 50 years irrespective of whether or not the president and/or other
state officials in office are “white men” or “[not]white men”.
JUST as in Africa, Clinton’s “white man” mantra would hardly be fit for
purpose as an explanation for
why she lost the United States November 2016 presidential poll.
References
